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Abstract
The issue of the conservatism of scientific research questions the nature and the role of the
internal and external forces controlling the emergence of new research questions or problems,
the exploration of risky directions of research, or the use of risky research methods.  This
issue has recently gained a new  framing  in connection with the growing importance of the
peer-review process and of the social and economic pressures weighing on the funding of
scientific research.  Current literature then interrogates the external and internal features that
promote what are described as conservative tendencies in scientific research. In this paper, I
propose  to  contribute  to  this  debate by clarifying  what  might  be internal  sources  of
conservatism in science; that is, that are inherent to the research process itself. I distinguish
two possible understandings of the sources and manifestations of this internal conservatism. I
first present a representational description of the nature and origin of conservatism in science,
which  brings  to  the fore  the  difficulties  researchers find in  setting aside their  conceptual
framework. I then offer for consideration a larger perspective on conservatism by arguing for
the  existence  of  a  practical conservatism  generated  by  all  the  dimensions  of  scientific
activities. In this framework, conservatism in science can be explained by the tendency of all
practices to close in on their own  local  objectives. I illustrate this view by reference to an
historical episode: the discovery of the chemical nature of genes by Avery. 
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1-Introduction: conservatism as an epistemological issue
In his 1945 report to president Roosevelt, the American scientist Vannevar Bush famously
defended the idea that ‘‘scientific progress on a broad front results from the free play of free
intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by their curiosity
for exploration of the unknown’’ (Bush 1945, p.13). This lyrical and idealized description of
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scientific activity, based on a somewhat naive valorization of scientists’ individual freedom,
may  look  very  old-fashioned  to  contemporary  eyes;  however,  the  singular  figure  of  the
untrammeled researcher ‘‘exploring the unknown’’ by giving free rein to ‘‘curiosity’’2 is still
abundantly  used  in  many  discourses  defending  a  quite  extreme  principle  of  institutional
autonomy for science, based on the freedom for individual3 researchers to set for themselves
the  directions  of  their  inquiry.  For  instance,  in  a  study  dedicated  to  the  conception  that
researchers have of the notion of ‘‘basic science’’, Calvert and Martin (2001, p. 12) found a
‘‘strong  definitional  emphasis  on  curiosity’’.  In  this  perspective,  ‘‘a  basic  researcher  is
someone  who  is  just  following  his  curiosity’’.  A  typical  illustration  of  this  intellectual
tradition is  given by the 1974 Nobel Prize winner Christian de Duve, who insists on the
epistemological value of individual curiosity in the following manner: 
Fund the investigator, not the investigation. Do please remember, I beseech you, this self-
evident  yet  rarely  recognized  truth  that  science,  at  least  its  spearhead  called  basic
research, explores the unknown and is  therefore unable, by definition, to predict how
useful or profitable its  discoveries will  be. Rather than demanding assurances on this
account that cannot possibly be honestly provided, put your trust in the investigator’s
skill, instinct, curiosity, and motivation (de Duve 2004, p. 21687). 
The same idea was expressed more recently by a consortium of British scientists, led by Sir
John Cadogan, which issued a report to the Learned Society of Wales defending the value of
‘‘curiosity-driven Blue Sky research’’: 
Government must also accept without challenge that the socioeconomic advancement of
humankind has  its  roots  in  science  and technology,  and  that  much  of  that  has  been
curiosity-driven. However, the nature of all politics and politicians means it is easier for
our paymasters to feel comfortable about the proclaiming of programs relating to Energy,
Health,  Materials,  Climate Change,  the Hydrogen Economy and so on, rather than to
announce, let alone trumpet, that money is available for scientists to follow their curiosity
in their own disciplines (Cadogan 2014, p. 2). 
The curiosity of scientists is notably opposed to the constraints exerted by political and social
demands,  which  orient  research  through  a  strategy  of  funding  based  on  the  selection  of
projects  a priori considered significant  (Wilholt  2010).  In this  framework,  peer-review is
often  condemned  as  “conservative”  (Lee  2015),  in  the  sense  that  it  would  inhibit  the
emergence of radically new questions, problems, or objects of research. For instance, it has
2As  recalled by Wilholt (2010) or Kummerfeld and Zollman (2016), their exists a rich tradition in classical
philosophy of science which puts to the fore this need for researchers to benefit from a large degree of freedom
in order to follow their “curiosity”. A well-known position here is that of Polanyi (1962), but we might also refer
to Popper's defense of free mutual criticism as an epistemological argument for a strong freedom and autonomy
of science (Popper 1972, p. 33-35). 
3Or, in a more sociologically realistic way, for small groups of researchers. 
been shown that the intellectual distance between the project submitted and the evaluator has
a negative influence on the judgment of this latter (Boudreau 2016). This kind of argument
then tends to oppose,  at  least implicitly,  an  external conservatism due to the institutional
organization  of  scientific  research4,  to  the  supposed  internal anti-conservatism,  or  anti-
conformism, of the research process itself, as it would be if led by free individuals. 
The political impacts of such an epistemological position are significant. Indeed, when faced
with the following pressing questions: ‘‘What will the research agenda for science be? How
should we distribute funding amongst  potential  and ongoing scientific  projects?’’  (Brown
2010, p. 131), it gives a very simple answer: ‘‘Fund people, not projects’’ (Ioannidis 2011)5.
Yet, even if we accept that current funding arrangements may have such a conservative effect,
it is still not at all certain that an alternative system promoting individual freedom would be
less “conservative” in this common sense. This idea was notably developed by Kummerfeld
and  Zollman  (2016, p.  1057),  who  suggested  that  “the  scientific  state  of  nature”  (a
hypothetical  state  where  individual  scientists  are  “left  to  their  own  devices”)  was
“conservative”. By this statement, they mean that the traditional idea  of the “natural state of
science” as “an endogenous source of diversity” (that they notably attribute to Bush 1945 and
Polanyi  1962)   is  “misplaced”.  Indeed,  they  claim that  there  exists,  within  the  scientific
community, a “conservative influence” (p. 1058) that they define as a tendency to congregate
on the apparently safer alternatives to solve a given problem or research question. Even if the
method used by Kummerfeld and Zollman (mathematic modeling) is not fully convincing,
this  way  of  posing  the  problem  seems  to  be  relevant:  are  the  institutional  funding
arrangements of science the only sources of its alleged conservatism? In which senses may
the research process be considered as internally (anti)-conservative? 
As we can see, the issue of conservatism in science is quite intricate, as it mixes together
epistemological  and  political,  descriptive  and  normative,  dimensions.  However,  there
currently exists  an interesting renewal of this debate on conservatism in science as a social
epistemology issue (Haufe 2013; Kummerfeld and Zollman 2016; Avin 2018; Harnagel 2018;
Currie 2018a, 2018b; O'Connor 2018; Hessen 2018). I argue that this recent literature frames
the  discussions in  an original  way.  Generally speaking,  this  framing is  structured by two
central elements:  (i)conservatism is studied as a proper epistemological issue. It is clearly
4Characterized by a peer-review based competitive selection of projects
5The reader may find elsewhere more details on the exact sense of this kind of position in terms of funding
schemes (Couée 2013; Braben 2008).  Whatever the exact content of these proposals, the important point is that
they are inherently biased by their ignorance of the internal sources of conservatism, as I state later in the paper. 
detached from its political meaning6; it is also, to a lesser extend, detached from sociological
considerations about the institutional dynamics of collaboration, cooperation and interactions.
More precisely, it puts to the fore the search for epistemological roots (that is to say, linked to
the very nature of the research process itself)  of the balance between “conservatism” and
“novelty”. (ii)There exists a relative axiological neutrality respect to the consequences of this
conservatism7. A central idea seems to be that a fine description of the nature, the origins and
the manifestations of conservatism in science is needed before judging in a normative way its
epistemological consequences.
More precisely, we can identify three registers of interrogation among this contemporaneous
social epistemology literature. First, it is not always clear what conservatism actually is (that
is to say, the kind of behavior of researchers or the properties of the research process that are
designated by this notion). Second, we may wonder which  internal (linked to the research
process  itself)  and  external (linked  to  the  funding  arrangements)  features  promote
conservative tendencies.  Third,  the question of the epistemological  consequences of  these
conservative tendencies arises.  Recently, various papers have tried to give answers to these
different issues. Harnagel (2018) and Avin (2018) study the effects of funding schemes (and
notably,  of  the  peer-review  based  selection)  on  the  “exploration”  of  a  given  epistemic
landscape. O'Connor (2018) argues that “conservative science” is naturally selected in the
highly  competitive  environment  currently  undergone  by  current  scientific  communities.
Heesen (2018) considers the role of the credit and rewards economy of science in promoting
or  impeding  the  activity  of  “risk-taking” scientists.  Adopting  a  wider  perspective,  Currie
(2018a, 2018b) opposes the notion of conservatism to those of creativity and novelty, even if
he grants that these are complex, polysemous notions. To him, they should nevertheless be
understood as offering a good departure point for studying the epistemic properties of the very
process  of  producing  knowledge,  taken  as  a  collective  endeavor.  Taking  this  argument
seriously, I propose, in this paper, to identify two possible conceptual frames describing the
internal  sources  of  this  so-called  conservatism,  conceived  of  as  inherent  to  the  research
process itself. I link the first one with Kuhn's model of scientific development, and I qualify it
as representational conservatism.  I then propose to complete it with a more general and more
accurate  conception  of  these  internal  conservative  tendencies  that  I  call  practical
6This point  is  important,  since the notion of conservatism has been mostly  developed to capture a form of
political or ideological  tought, including by some influent sociologist of science, such as Mannheim (1986). 
7It  certainly  would  have  been  possible,  and  perhaps more  relevant,  to  avoid  using  the  confusing term of
conservatism in this debate. For instance, the notion of “inertia” would have been well adapted to describe the
epistemological features of the research process that this literature aims to capture.  
conservatism. A case study (the discovery of the chemical nature of genes by Avery) is used
to illustrate this notion. 
Let me note here that this contrast between representational and practical conservatism as
conceptual frameworks draws on the classical criticism of the theory-focused perspective on
scientific change, often associated to Kuhn's work and opposed to a more practice-oriented
philosophy  of  science  (Ankeny  and  Leonelli  2016).  This  practice-oriented  philosophy  of
science notably recognizes that “experiments have a life of their own” (Hacking 1983, p. x),
that is to say that the refinement or discussions of theories are not the only motor of scientific
activities. However, my aim is not to give a formal criticism of Kuhn's views, but to propose
two  possible  readings  of  this  notion  of  conservatism by  presenting  two general  ways  of
describing conservative behaviors.  
2-What is conservatism of scientific research?
As it is most classically used in the literature, the “conservatism” of science generally refers
to an alleged (spontaneous or institutional) tendency to give priority to problems, questions,
methods,  theories  or  practices  already  known,  and/or  considered  as  relatively  safe,  over
unknown, poorly explored, and/or risky ones. As I remark in my introduction, the concept is
abundantly  used  to  qualify,  in  a  critical  perspective,  certain  features  of  contemporary
scientific  institutions.  Interestingly,  many  national  scientific  agencies  draw  on  a  similar
opposition when establishing their funding programs. As reported by O'Malley et al. (2009)
and  Haufe  (2013),  the  NIH  and  the  NSF  establish  a  contrast  between  regular  grant
applications  (R01 in  NIH),  and “exploratory”,  “risky”,  or  “innovative”  applications  (R21
program  of  NIH  and  EAGER  grants  of  NSF).  These  latter  are  explicitly  described  as
promoting a form of novelty, whereas the former should be based on well founded hypothesis
and well known methods.  
Given this somewhat intuitive apprehension, it might appear that the notion of conservatism is
not  well  defined,  and  that  its  meaning  depends  on  the  choice  of  opposing  concept:
conservatism  may  be  opposed  to  creativity,  innovation,  revolution,  etc8.  In  the  current
literature on conservatism in science, and as explicitly noted by Currie (2018a), the notion of
conservatism in social epistemology makes sense as opposed to that of novelty (in testing a
new method, formulating a new explanation or theory for a known phenomenon,  collecting
8I thank an anonymous reviewer for having insisted on this point.
new data)9. Like that of conservatism, this notion of novelty is not easy to assess, essentially
because it is a matter of degree. However, importantly, I argue that it is not needed, in a first
step, to have a much clearer definition of conservatism and novelty that the ones we find in
current literature in social epistemology. Indeed, I make the hypothesis, with Currie (2018a),
that the centrality of this balance between conservatism and novelty in the literature highlights
the fact that some forces constrain, regulate, or limit the kinds of problem or question that are
susceptible to being addressed by the scientific communities.  The very existence of these
constraints defines a first, minimal level of conservatism inherent to the process of scientific
research as a collective endeavor. Reciprocally, the identification and characterization of these
constraints  (which  is  the  main  aim  of  this  paper)  will  illuminate  what  might  be  called
conservatism (and novelty) within the research process. One of the aim of this paper is then
precisely to  clarify the  meaning of  this  antagonism conservatism  vs.  novelty in  scientific
research, as it is used in recent literature in social epistemology.
In the scope of this paper, I then focus on this singular dimension of the classical debate on
conservatism  by  questioning  the  exact  nature  of  the  constraints  that  guide  the  kinds  of
problem that are worthy of being posed and resolved. Furthermore, I limit the scope of this
interrogation to the internal sources of conservatism, inherent to the research process itself.
By doing so, I aim to offer a more general perspective on the traditional, multidimensional
debate on conservatism in science. Whereas many contemporary contributions try to identify
specific, precise mechanisms, institutions, or cognitive behaviors that are held to promote a
form  of  conservatism,  this  paper  suggests  a  conceptual  clarification  of  the  notion  by
distinguishing two generic  ways of  describing  the  sources  of  the  conservative  tendencies
inherent to the research process itself. I link the first to Kuhn’s (1962, 1977) work.  I show
that this view of conservatism may be qualified as  representational since it focuses on the
scientists resistance to stepping outside of a given conceptual framework. Using a case study
(that of Avery’s discovery of the nature of genes), I suggest adopting a more general view on
conservatism, by considering the role of the full range of scientific practices, in their multiple
dimensions  (instrumental,  experimental,  technical,  theoretical),  in  the  generation  of  a
practical conservatism.  Let me note that the kind of conservatism I am considering is taken
as being anterior to any institutional scheme (for instance, funding schemes) regulating the
functioning  of  the  scientific  community:  in  this  sense,  it  corresponds  to  the  internal
9We  can  cite  here  the  Kuhnian  antagonism  between  “tradition”  and  “innovation”  (Kuhn  1977)  and  the
opposition between “exploration” and “exploitation” mobilized by Polanyi (1962).
conservatism  of  the  (abstract)  “scientific  state  of  nature”  of  Kummerfeld  and  Zollman
(2016)10. 
3-Representational conservatism
Many classical perspectives on conservatism in science were developed in the so-called “big
systems” proposed in the 60-80s by philosophers and historians such as T. S. Kuhn (1962), I.
Lakatos, or L. Laudan.  These historicist theories of rationality aimed at “stress[ing] the depth
of major historical  changes and the resulting challenges to cumulative scientific  progress”
(Nickels 2017). It  is usual enough to consider that in this framework, and in particular in
Kuhn's  perspective,  the  conservative  forces  (as  I  defined  them  previously)  are  mainly
conceived  as  a  matter  of  representation.  It  is  the  resistance  of  scientists  to  quit  a  given
conceptual  frame  which  constrains  the  emergence  of  new  kinds  of  research  problems,
questions or objects. Reciprocally, scientific changes are “primarily generated and shaped by
theoretical developments” (Ankeny and Leonelli 2016, p. 18). Even if the Kuhnian notion of
paradigm is made manifest  through a collection of techniques,  protocols,  and instruments
(Masterman  1970),  it  indeed  seems  that  in  Kuhn’s  perspective,  scientific  changes  are
conceived of as being primarily the result of representational changes. Three major arguments
can be used to justify this point: 
First, the notion of epistemic “fertility” or “fecundity”, central to Kuhn's explanation of why
scientists  are  attached  to  the  paradigms  in  which  they  work,  is  understood  through  the
empirical adequacy of theories. This notion applies to concepts and theories,  and may be
understood  as  their  capacity  to  pose  new  questions  and/or  to  explain  new  phenomena
(Schindler 2017). More generally,  it  reflects a classical link between experimentation and
theories, where the first is seen exclusively as serving the justification or the refinement of the
second. As explicitly stated by Kuhn, “much of the research undertaken within a research
tradition is an attempt to adjust existing theories or existing observations in order to bring the
two into closer and closer agreement” (Kuhn 1977, p. 233).  This theoretical perspective on
experiment (and more generally on scientific practices) was classically criticized by the so-
called  “practical  turn”  in  the  history  and  philosophy  of  science11,  and  notably  by  Ian
Hacking’s (1983, 1992) works on experimental practices. Through the idea that “experiments
10Let me also note that this paper focuses on the descriptive dimensions of the debate on conservatism, and sets
aside the normative question of the relevance of designing scientific institutions and/or funding schemes which
limit or promote conservatism. 
11See section 5 for more details on this “practical turn”.
have a life of their own” (Hacking 1983, p. x), Hacking convincingly advocates a view of the
research process more complex than of the mere construction and justification of theories,
models, and hypotheses. By contrast, even if Kuhn recognizes that implicit knowledge plays
an  important  role  in  the  scientific  process,  and  that  the  paradigms  have  technical  and
instrumental dimensions, his notion of fecundity seems to be very representational: it applies
to theories as sets of articulated concepts and laws, and is measured in terms of the agreement
between theoretical predictions and facts. 
Second,  the  motor  of  change  in  Kuhn’s  theory  is  the  accumulation  of  anomalies.  An
unexpected or problematic result is an anomaly if it conflicts explicitly with a “structurally
central  tenet  of  current  scientific  belief”  (p.  237).  Thus,  anomalies  are  mainly
representational, in the sense that they are opposed to current concepts, theories, or world
views. Yet, authors affiliated to the “practical turn” have demonstrated that it is often our
capacity  of  intervention  and  experimental  manipulation  that  leads  to  old  tools  being
abandoned  and  new  tools  adopted  (Waters  2014).  Consequently,  the  Kuhnian  focus  on
theories as the motor of scientific changes (and respectively, as the cause of conservatism)
constitutes a strongly debatable hypothesis. 
Third,  the  notion  of  incommensurability,  which  evolved  a  great  deal  throughout  Kuhn’s
intellectual trajectory, was finally interpreted as being a property of the networks of concepts.
Sankey (1993) summed up this evolution by noting that “originally, incommensurability was
a  relation  of  methodological,  observational  and  conceptual  disparity  between  paradigms.
Kuhn restricted the notion to the semantical sphere and assimilated it to the indeterminacy of
translation”  (p.  759).  In  particular,  in  his  1982  article  entitled  “Commensurability,
Comparability,  Communicability”  (Kuhn  1982),  Kuhn  clarified  the  concept  of
incommensurability as a semantic problem, by assimilating it to the Quinean notion of the
indeterminacy  of  translation.  In  this  interpretation,  two  distinct  (scientific)  languages  are
incommensurable  because  the  corresponding  terms  used  do  not  have  exactly  the  same
reference in the real world. This perspective is considered quite radical since it implies the
genuine incommensurability of networks of concepts constituting a theory as a representation
of  the natural  world.   Correlatively,  paradigms are fully  assimilated to  world  views,  and
scientific changes are primarily changes of representation. 
The question remains open  as to whether this description of Kuhn's view of conservatism and
change as being focused on theories (or representations) does full justice to the complexity
and nuances of Kuhn's position.  However, I argue that various aspects of Kuhn's work, and
some of the classical and widespread interpretations of it, involve a specific perspective on the
nature  of  the  epistemic  constraints  guiding  the  formulation  of  research  problems. If  we
consider  seriously  the  criticisms  of  the  authors  of  the  “practical  turn”  in  history  and
philosophy  of  science,  these  constraints  are described  in  Kuhn's  views as  being  rather
representational,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  linked  to  a  network  of  explicit  or  implicit
representations, concepts, and laws. Generally speaking, it is thus a certain representation of
the  world  that  determines  the  kind  of  questions  the  researchers  consider  as  interesting.
Likewise,  it  is  a  certain  representation  of  the  world  that  inhibits  the  emergence  of  new
problems or objects of study. In the frame of this representational conservatism, the motor of
scientific “innovation”, and reciprocally the force of “tradition”, are  mainly explainable in
terms of theories and representations12. In the vocabulary I proposed in my introduction, this
means  that  the  conservatism of  the  research  process  is  primarily  representational.  In  the
following sections,  I  argue that  this  representational  conservatism is  not  false,  but  rather
incomplete,  since it  does not consider enough the fact that  some dimensions of scientific
practices might  have a conservative influence independently of the existing theoretical  or
conceptual frame. I suggest that it should be incorporated (at least in part) into a more general
perspective on conservatism that I call practical conservatism, which includes a wider range
of  aspects  of  scientific  practices  as  being  proper  sources (and  not  just  objects)  of
conservatism:  creating  and  purifying  a  phenomenon  in  the  laboratory,  constructing  an
experimental instrument, collecting data, building a theory, a law or a model, etc. I begin with
a case study: Avery’s discovery of the chemical nature of genes. 
4-Case study: Avery’s discovery of the chemical nature of genetic information
a-General presentation
12Let me insiste again on the following point: the so called “practical turn” in history and philosophy of science
often takes Kuhn's work as the a typical instance of a “theory-centered” perspective on scientific development.
Clearly,  this  strategy  operates  a  certain  reduction  of  the  numerous  (and  sometimes  contradictory)  writings
proposed by Kuhn. It is clearly possible to nuance this attribution of a “theory-centered” perspective to Kuhn,
but I do argue, with many authors (see, for recent instances, Soler 2014 or Ankeny 2016) that in a spectrum
going from Kuhn to contemporaneous philosophers of science, there is a certain trend from a representational to
a  practical  perspective on  scientific  development.  My  contrast  between  representational  and  practical
conservatism mirrors this well accepted opposition.
Avery’s work is well known by historians of science as a case of an important discovery (that
the DNA, and not the proteins, carries the genetic information) which was ignored, in a sense
that I will hereafter clarify, by contemporary scientists (Morange 2000, p. 45-53). Avery was
working at the Rockefeller Institute of New York on the characterization of pneumococcus
(the bacteria involved in tuberculosis). He notably studied the structure of the bacterial capsid,
which carries the molecules responsible for the virulence of pneumococcus.  By 1930, Avery
and his team began to focus on a strange phenomenon, called “transformation”, which was
first observed by Griffith in 1928. The concept of “transformation” refers to the ability of
virulent pneumococcus, carrying a capsid (named S pneumococcus), to transfer the ability to
synthesie  the  capsid  to  non-virulent  ones  (named R pneumococcus).   The  most  classical
transformation experiment is the following: by adding a sample of dead S pneumococcus to
live R pneumococcus, we can generate S pneumococcus - that is to say, bacteria which cause
tuberculosis. In other words, in S (virulent) pneumococcus there is a chemical “transformative
principle” which can be transferred to R (non-virulent) pneumococcus and gives it the ability
to generate  a  capsid and become virulent.  After  ten years of  delicate  experimental  work,
Avery and his co-workers published a famous paper showing that the transforming principle
was a nucleic acid, and not a protein (Avery 1944). Retrospectively, this result had a double
impact: for the understanding of the transformation phenomenon itself and, more largely, for
genetic and fundamental biology. At the time, the chemical nature of the molecule carrying
genetic information was not precisely known. Most scientists thought it was a mix of DNA
and proteins, but the exact role of each of these components was not known (Wyatt 1972, p.
88). The aim of this fourth section is to report the noteworthy way in which this discovery
was not integrated into scientific practices, despite being considered theoretically important. 
b-Analysis of Avery's work
The essential part of Avery’s 1944 article is dedicated to the description of the methods used
to isolate and characterize the gene product responsible for the transformative power. In it, we
find  a  detailed  presentation  of  the  purification  protocol  (p.  138-144),  and  of  a  range  of
chemical tests aiming at identifying the molecule obtained: its general chemical properties (p.
145), its elementary composition and the effects of different kinds of enzymes (p. 146-149),
immunological  analysis  (p.  150),  physical  study (ultracentrifugation,  electrophoresis),  and
quantification of biological activity (p. 151). Interestingly, the wider interest of Avery’s result
for fundamental biology is  neither evoked in the title, nor in the abstract. The discussion
rapidly notes that “the phenomenon [can] be interpreted from a genetic point of view” (p.
155), by considering “the inducing substance” as a gene, and “the capsular antigen which is
produced in response to it (…) as a gene product”. Yet, the reference made to the question of
the transmission of the characters in the introduction (p. 137) shows that the authors  knew
perfectly well that their results were of interest beyond their implication for the phenomenon
of  transformation  itself.  Furthermore,  Wyatt  (1972)  presents  numerous  historical  proofs
showing that even if Avery did not insist, in his article, on the importance of his discovery for
fundamental genetics, he “was well aware of [its] implication” (p. 87).  By examining the
private correspondence of Avery, he notes that Avery explicitly considered that he might have
isolated “a pure gene in the form of deoxyribonucleic acid” (Idem). 
The perspective for future work he gives at the end of his article are nonetheless restricted to
technical considerations about the production of the transformation phenomenon. He notes
that  it  “would  be  of  interest  to  know  the  relation  between  the  rate  of  reaction  and
concentration of the transforming substance; the proportion of cells transformed to those that
remain unaffected in the reaction system”.  His aim is thus explicitly to find a way to “induce
transformation in a suspension of resting cells under conditions inhibiting growth” (pp. 153-
154). Avery’s over-insistence on these technical goals may seem surprising in comparison
with the general importance of his observations for fundamental biology. Interestingly, Avery
effectively followed the program he proposes in his article and, during the following years,
tried to improve the protocol of transformation of pneumococcus as a laboratory phenomenon
(Morange 2000, p. 53).
c-Reception of Avery's work
Surprisingly,  it  is  also  the case  that  Avery’s  discovery  had few consequences  on genetic
research. In his study of the reception of Avery’s work, Wyatt clearly shows that the different
scientific  communities  which  could  have  been  interested  by  Avery’s  results  about  DNA
largely ignored them in the definition of their research programs. Notably, the geneticists
(such  as  Beadle  and  Tatum,  Morgan’s  group,  or  the  Phage  Group)  “were  not  greatly
influenced by the news” (p. 87), even if they were all well aware of Avery’s work. Large
symposiums  dealing  with  heredity  (such  as  that  at  Cold  Spring  Harbor  in  1946)  just
mentioned  the  results  in  passing.  On  the  other  hand,  all  these  scientists  recognized  the
theoretical importance  of  Avery’s  discovery.  For  instance,  in  “semi-popular”  scientific
journals (such as American Scientist), many articles were written to report it as “an extremely
fundamental contribution to all biological sciences” (p. 88, my emphasis). However, Avery's
result was rapidly forgotten by the scientific community. It was independently re-assessed
eight years later by Hershey and Chase (1952), in a research program13 which was explicitly
designed to identify the chemical nature of the genes.
d-Discussion: “post-maturity” and scientific conservatism
This episode is then characterized by a highly paradoxical situation, where a discovery whose
potential importance is not ignored by scientists is nonetheless  not taken into account as a
possible new direction of research.  Retrospectively, the behavior both of Avery and of the
scientific  community as a  whole  is  quite  surprising.  Indeed, in 1944,  the question of the
chemical  nature  of  genetic  information  was  not  in  practice  considered  as  an  interesting
problem  for  scientists.  Certainly,  it  was  considered  as  an  important  question  from  a
theoretical  perspective.  But  it  was  not  a  research question motivating scientific  practice.
Retrospectively,  the  reception  of  Avery’s  result  thus  demonstrates  a  significant  lack  of
curiosity on the part of researchers. Contrary to a model of scientific development focused on
the “exploratory” dynamics, the researchers did not use Avery’s observation to define a new
object of study – DNA. The geneticists did not formulate a new research question, and Avery
himself remained focused on his original question – the transformation phenomenon.  In other
words,  Avery’s  episode  shows  up  a  tendency  to  conservatism within  the  community  of
geneticists and biologists in the 1940’s. 
Various explanations of this conservative behavior could be given. Morange (2009) highlights
certain sociological, institutional, and intellectual reasons for the fate of Avery’s discovery (p.
3-4).  However,  none of  them can give a  good account  of  the surprising fact  that  “if  the
experiment of Avery was not accepted, it was not rejected either” (Idem). More precisely,
historians  of  science  have  to  face  a  strange  situation  where  a  discovery  recognized  as
theoretically important is, at the same time, ignored within scientific practice. To deal with
this  mysterious  behavior,  Morange (2000) (p.48)  refers  to  the distinction made by Wyatt
(1972)  between  “information”  and  “knowledge”.  Elsewhere  in  his  history  of  molecular
biology, he mobilizes the notion of “post-maturity”, introduced by Zuckerman and Lederberg
(1986) to describe similar kinds of events, where, in their practices, scientists ignore for a
long time an important theoretical question. He notably uses it in the case of Beadle and
13That of the “Phage Group”, see Mullins (1972) for details. 
Tatum’s work on the link between genes and enzymes (p. 31-40), and to explain the late
discovery of RNAm (p.188). This concept is then mobilized to qualify an occasional “lack of
curiosity” on the part  of scientists  (p.192).  Clearly, this kind of intuitive notion of “post-
maturity”  aims  at  describing  a  certain  form of  conservatism that  is  inherent  to  scientific
development. 
Does  the  representational  conservatism previously  presented  sufficiently  well  capture  the
form of conservatism manifest in Avery’s case? Ignorance of Avery’s discovery was clearly
not due to representational barriers. On the contrary, the knowledge of the chemical nature of
genes perfectly matched the conceptual framework grounding molecular biology and genetics.
Furthermore, it would have been technically possible for geneticists to take it as a source of
interesting research problems: how could DNA be the support of genes? What link subsists
between genes and proteins? The work of the members of the “Phage Group”, for instance,
constitutes a good justification of this idea: they independently posed and solved the problem
of the nature of the genes a few years later, without having any knowledge of Avery’s work
(Morange 2000). Technical or experimental obstacles are thus not sufficient to explain the
disinterest for Avery’s discovery. If neither representational framework nor technical barriers
are the causes of this lack of scientific curiosity for Avery’s result, how might we explain it?
In the next section, I propose the notion of practical conservatism as a descriptive tool for
understanding this particular dynamic of the research process. 
5-Practical conservatism
The  so-called  “practical  turn”  or  “practical  trend”  in  the  philosophy  of  science  aims  at
providing a more exhaustive picture of  the scientific  dynamics  than the allegedly theory-
focused classical reading of the historical evolution of knowledge and scientific activities
(Soler 2014). Even if it is not clear what intellectual movement this “practical turn” aims at
replacing, it is quite common to consider that it is characterized by a (more explicit) desire to
study  scientific  practices  in  all  their  diversity  (Nordmann  2014).  A major  source  of  this
“practical turn” is the so-called “new experimentalism” notably launched by I. Hacking. By
considering  that  “experiments  have  a  life  of  their  own”  (Hacking  1983,  p.  x),  this
philosophical  program insists  that  the experimental  and technical  dimensions  of scientific
activities  (interventions)  should  not  be  considered  as  mere  tools  of  justification  or  the
refinement of theories, concepts, or models (representations). One of the current challenges of
the “practical turn” is thus to consider the integration of representation and intervention as
distinct  but  interconnected dimensions  of  scientific  activities  (Woody 2014).   In  order  to
ground the notion of practical conservatism, I will retain here the framework proposed by
Chang (2014)  for  considering this  integration  of  scientific  activities  into  hierarchical  and
interconnected systems of practice. For Chang, all scientific activity, whether it consists in
technical, instrumental, experimental, or mental operations (manipulating live cells, lighting a
match, testing a microscope, isolating a phenomenon in the laboratory, defining a concept)
has  to  be  thought  as having both (an)  external  function(s)  and an internal  objective.   Its
internal objective constitutes its proper end, and its external function describes how it serves a
larger goal. For instance, the activity14 of lighting a match may be realized in order to light a
Bunsen burner. This last activity (lighting a Bunsen burner) also has an external function: for
instance, to “get a combustion-analysis of an organic compound” (Chang 2014, p. 73). The
important  point  is  that  the  internal  objective  of  an  activity  (to  light  a  Bunsen  burner)
constitutes the external function of the subsequent ones (to light a match). Following Chang’s
views, all scientific activities thus belong to one or various systems of practice, which are
structured into networks of hierarchically-organized objectives15. This being the case, each
system  of  practice  may  be  thought  as  being  embedded  in  others;  furthermore,  distinct,
independent systems of practice may coexist. For instance, theoretical physics (as a system of
practice) co-exists with cellular biology (as another system of practice). In some cases, two
systems of practices may be connected through a shared activity. Typically, an experimental
technique may be used in different contexts,  for very distinct  purposes.  For  instance,  the
activity of using electronic microscopy may be shared by cellular biology, chemistry, and
physics. 
Let us return to Avery’s work. In this case, a general objective of the system of practice in
which it was embedded may have been the study of the pathogenic power of pneumococcus.
Within this general framework, Avery dedicated a sub-system of practices to the study of the
transformation phenomenon. Within this sub-system of practice, two distinct objectives then
motivated two sub-sub-systems of practice. The first was the isolation and purification of the
transformation phenomenon as a laboratory object. This notably passes through identification
of  the  culture  media  which  favor  it.  The  second  was  the  search  for  the  transformative
14Chang (2014) distinguishes the notions of act and activity, the last one implying “a routinized and repeated
performance  of  the  act,  which  the  agents  involved  carry  out  according  to  a  reasonably  fixed  set  of  rules
governing their attempts to achieve the aim of the activity” (p. 73).
15A useful graphic representation of Chang’s notion of system of practice is presented in the commentary of
Chang’s text by L. Soler and R. Catinaud (Soler 2014, p. 80-92).  
principle, using many distinct chemical and biological techniques. It led to the isolation of
DNA as the molecular support of heredity.  If we take a step back, we may note that Avery’s
system of practices coexisted with other systems of practices in the more general frame of
modern biology (including genetics, molecular biology and biochemistry).  I  may cite the
classical (Mendelian) geneticists working on the inheritance of characteristics; for instance,
Morgan’s group and its famous experiments on Drosophila. Another system of practices was
the one developed by the physicians of the so-called Phage Group working on the molecular
mechanisms of heredity in the bacteriophage Lambda (Mullins 1972). 
In this framework, how can we explain the conservative tendency manifested by the geneticist
community after Avery’s discovery? In a nutshell, we could say that the most local objectives
pursued  by  Avery  (isolating  and  studying  bacterial  transformation  as  a  laboratory
phenomenon) was prioritized over the formulation of a new research question (for instance,
the structure of DNA and its exact role in heredity), even if this latter would have had a wider
scope of interest (here, the comprehension of the molecular mechanisms of heredity, or the
even  broader  project  of  the  molecular  description  of  life  by  molecular  biology).  As  a
consequence, the local system of practice undertaken by Avery was given priority both over
more  general  ones,  and over  coexisting  ones  (for  instance,  that  developed  by  the  Phage
Group). 
In other words, we could say that Avery and the geneticist community favored the stability of
the  local  system of  practices  they  were  embedded in over  the  progress  of  co-existing  or
radically  new  research  questions.  For  instance,  Avery  made  the  choice  to  focus  on  the
purification and isolation of transformation as a laboratory phenomenon, by designing new
protocols which aimed at making it visible. By doing so, he gave priority to the activities he
had first developed to study bacterial transformation. Similarly, the geneticists' community
remained focused on the internal objectives of their own system of practices. In this case, the
movement of  closure  of the systems of practice on their initial objectives seems to be the
cause of the conservative tendency identified in Avery’s case. My thesis is that this movement
may be the manifestation of a practical conservatism, and that this practical conservatism is
an inherent feature of the research process. Practical conservatism may thus be characterized
in  the  following  terms.  All  scientific  activities,  from  the  most  technical  to  the  most
conceptual,  theoretical,  or  representational  ones,  take  place in  a  system of  hierarchically-
organized  objectives,  which  constitutes  a  system  of  practice  (or  more  precisely,  a
superposition of systems of practice)16. The existence of a practical conservatism implies that
these systems of practice tend to favor their own stability  – that is to say, the maintenance of
the  existing  practices.  To  say it  another  way,  the  local practices  scientists  are  currently
leading tend to have priority in defining the problems or research questions to be pursued. The
important point here is that this conservatism is not only caused by the representational frame,
but is generated by  all kinds of scientific practices. For instance, the ignorance of Avery’s
discovery by the geneticists and by Avery himself was not due to an intellectual barrier, but to
a preference given to the systems of practice which were currently  being pursued. These
systems of practice included very technical activities, such as the isolation of the bacteria
transformation as a laboratory phenomenon17. 
6-Representational conservatism as a particular case of practical conservatism
As a principle of maintenance of the systems of practice, practical conservatism applies at all
levels  of  these  the  systems  of  scientific  practices,  from  the  most  technical  to  the  most
theoretical  dimensions  of  scientific  activities.  As  a  consequence,  I  argue  that  the
representational conservatism I attributed to Kuhn may be conceived, at least for a part, as a
particular  case  of  this  practical  conservatism.  Indeed,  the  resistance  of  scientists  to
abandoning a certain conceptual framework may be interpreted as a priority given to the most
general, theoretical, conceptual objectives shared by all the systems of practice which develop
in the framework of a given paradigm (in a nutshell, the development or refinement of the
intellectual framework structuring this paradigm). For instance, in modern biology, it is well-
known that  scientists  tend  to  give  priority  to  reductionist  approaches  – for example in
explaining diseases  – over more organicist or holistic ones (Marcum 2010). Obviously, as
already noticed by Kuhn, this conservatism is far for from being systematically negative from
an epistemological point of view18. 
As a consequence, representational and practical conservatism are not entirely antagonistic
conceptions  of  conservatism  in  science.  On  the  contrary,  the  reference  to  practical
16It is important to insist on the fact that each system of practice is itself included in larger ones, motivated by
larger-scope goals.
17Let me repeat that my objective is not normative: I do not aim at judging the epistemological consequences of
this conservatism. My goal is only to describe a possible source of conservatism in science, this concept of
conservatism being understood in the broad and classical sense given in the introduction and in section 2.
18Indeed, the resistance of scientists to abandoning a certain paradigm may be, in part, explained by its proper
fecundity, in the classical sense of this term (Schindler 2017). 
conservatism may be understood as a more general perspective on conservatism: as the most
representational  parts  of  scientific  research  (elaboration  of  theories,  of  conceptual
frameworks,  etc.)  are  also scientific  practices  (Soler  2014),  I  argue  that  a  practical
conservatism may apply to them. However, this does not exclude that there may be a purely
representational  conservatism,  specifically  linked  to  the  (psychological,  intellectual)
constraints exerted by a conceptual framework on scientific activities. Finally, practical and
representational  conservatism  constitute  two  complementary  conceptions  of  the  internal
sources of conservatism in science. 
As  I  stated  previously,  this  contrast  between  practical  and  representational  conservatism
echoes a traditional divide between a theory-oriented and a practice-oriented philosophy of
science. Consequently, Avery's case might find an interpretation in some recent contributions
which aim at giving a description of scientific change that takes into account the diversity of
the social,  material,  and institutional  conditions  of  the research process.  For  instance,  the
concept of scientific “repertoire” is defined by Ankeny and Leonelli (2016) as an “assemblage
of skills, behaviors, and material, social, and epistemic components that a group may use to
practice certain kinds of science” (p. 18). As this notion is explicitly conceived as broader
than that of the “system of practice” (Chang 2014) which forms the conceptual basis of our
argument,  it  seems that  Avery's  case  could  surely  be  interpreted  by  using  this  notion  of
repertoire. However, my aim is not to give an exhaustive description of all the dimensions of
the dynamics of scientific change: I focus on what I call the internal sources of conservatism,
defined as those inherent to the research process itself19. 
7-Discussion: internal and external sources of conservatism
19Let me note here that this description of  a “practical conservatism”, which identifies some internal constraints
on the definition of research problems, should be completed in the future by a more formal account of what is a
significant problem. It is not the aim of this paper to go further in this direction, but I think that the pragmatist
tradition, and notably Dewey's views on the logic of scientific inquiry (Dewey 1938), could bring an interesting
perspective  on  Avery's  case,  and  on  practical  conservatism  in  general.  For  Dewey  indeed,  the  notion  of
“problem” makes sense in the very local context of a given practice. A problem is formulated on the basis of an
“indetermination”  met in the course  of a  concrete  practice,  and which can  take a large  diversity  of forms:
conceptual doubt, technical difficulty, surprising result, etc. The important point is that these indeterminations
are formulated into well-posed problems only if they constitute an  obstacle  for the pursuit of the practice at
stake.  This offers a possible interpretative frame to Avery's episode: the issue of the nature of genes was not
considered  as  an  interesting  problem  since  its  resolution  was  not  useful  for  the  current  practices  led  by
geneticists. This reference to pragmatism might then be a useful tool to conceptualize the notion of  a “problem”
in a way that would be compatible with my description of a “practical conservatism”.   
To conclude, let me clarify this last point. This article may be taken as an attempt at clarifying
the issue of the conservatism of scientific research. In this framework, I mainly propose to
renew reflection on the internal source of conservatism by introducing the notion of practical
conservatism,  which  I  contrast  with  the  representational  conservatism,  thus  hoping  to
complete the concept. This work is mainly descriptive, and does not aim at giving normative
assessments about the way science should be organized to limit the (supposed)  negative
epistemic consequences of conservatism. 
However, the identification of the internal sources of conservatism is a necessary step for
conceiving  the  impact  of  funding  arrangements  on  the  production  of  knowledge.  As  I
remarked in my introduction,  many criticisms of the contemporary governance of science
insist on the fact that the current ways of governing science would impoverish research by
promoting mainstream or safe alternatives. Notably, the selection of projects using a peer-
review process  is  commonly  accused  of  being  conservative and  inefficient  (Haufe  2013;
Boudreau 2016; Avin 2018).  The common implicit hypothesis shared by these positions is
that scientists would do better if left alone (Kummerfeld and Zollman 2016). In other words,
on such a view the sources of conservatism  are seen as being mainly external to the research
process, in the sense that they are mainly due to the contingent features of the institutional
organization  of  science.   It  has  to  be  noted  that  this  position  is  anchored  in  a  rich
philosophical tradition which insists on the diverse epistemological benefits that freedom and
autonomy  would  confere  to  scientific  research  (Wilholt  2010).  Consequently,
contemporaneous works on this notion of conservatism have an importance for fundamental
philosophy of science, noably because it implies to discuss the roles that free curiosity play
and should play in the research process.  Against these views which insist on the external
sources of conservatism, the analysis presented here aims at showing that there may also be
strong internal sources of conservatism, inherent to the research process. In a more practical
dimension, the question remains open of deciding how the identification of these sources of
conservatism may influence reflection on science policy.
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